

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## REPORT

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# Domestic and International Situation of Yugoslavia

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# The Quarrel between Tito and the Cominform

1. There exists perhaps a fifty percent chance that the Cominform might effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia, but Tito himself would never be included in such a gesture. The situation of Kardelj, Djilas, and especially Rankovic, is not so hopeless; the Russians might use them for a time under certain circumstances, but in the end they also would be liquidated. Moscow will never forgive the rebels. Tito is capable of turning toward nationalism while clinging to his socialist ideology. At least eighty percent of the Yugoslav population would welcome such a volte-face, and Tito would probably obtain the support of such non-Communist political leaders as Ivan Subasic, Milan Grol, Mica Jovanovic, Dragoljub Jovanovic, and Juraj Gosar for this step. But the other Communist leaders are not likely to permit Tito to embrace nationalism and turn toward the West, since they know that this action would lead, sooner or later, to their removal. Tito is, in effect, a prisoner of the Yugoslav Politburo; for this reason he is not primarily responsible for the present Yugoslav policy of terrorism. For this policy Rankovic is chiefly responsible. Tito is merely the public and formal embodiment of the decisions of the Yugoslav Politburo and is, therefore, bound by them. His life would be endangered should he act otherwise. Despite their predilections, however, the other Communist leaders of Yugoslavia must support Tito. Although they keep careful watch to see that he follows the official Yugoslav Communist Party line, these leaders realize that only Tito possesses any popularity with the Yugoslav people. They must, therefore, support him. These leaders are on the horns of a dilemma. If Tito turns to the West they will lose their power and their lucrative positions; they likewise know that they cannot expect forgiveness from the Russians even though they betrayed Tito and returned to the Cominform. Soviet gratitude would last only until Tito was overthrown.

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If Tito does not find support in the West, however, his regime may be endangered. Some members of the Yugoslav Politburo might turn to the Russians, hoping that the Russians would reward their action. But Tito can only be overthrown by force; and inside Yugoslavia this force can be supplied by the UDB and the police of Rankovic.

Attitude of the Yugoslav Army toward Tito

2. The Communist generals, such as Ivan Gosnjak, Milan Kupresanin, Nadj, Koca Popovic, Peko Dapcevic, and Svetozar Vukmanovic (Tempo) regard the professional soldiers with disdain. But all of them are dependent upon Tito and know that they are finished if he turns to the West. All hope that he will again establish good relations with the Soviets and the Red Army. These generals, who are not professionals, are capable of deserting to the Soviets if they see that Tito is lost. Most of Tito's supporters are found among the professional soldiers. The Communist generals, who are more politicians than soldiers, will follow along with the civilian politicians. As long as Tito guides them successfully through the surrounding dangers, they will support him; if his position begins to weaken, however, many will defect to the Russians.

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